Editorial by Editors,
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly. Except July. August and September. by the University of Pensyl-
vania Law School. at 236 Chestnut Street; Philadelphia. Pa.. and
34th and Chestnut Street% Philadelphia. Pa.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER AxxNLM; SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS
Board of Editors
LEMUEL BI3,ADDOCK SCHOFIELDEditor-In-Chlef
Associate Editors
JAM.%1ES McK. BRITTAIN i.O01NEY T. BONSALL
GEORGE F. DOVGLS RAYIMOND K. DENWORTH
EDWAID EISNSTNIX EAIILSTOX L. HARGETT
D. IIEE\I'S IHENIY THOMAS L. HOBAN
BEN JAMIN AT. KLINE GEORGE N. KEMP
LOUIS E. LEVINTHAL EDWIN A.- LUCAS
PAUL C. WAGNER ROBERT IV. OWENS
LEO WEINIOTT W. FOSTER REEVE, M
RICHARD H. WOOLSEY P. HERBERT REIGNER
BARNIE WINNIELMAN
Bus inesa Manager
B. IL SNOVER
NOTES.
CARRIERS-C.ARMACK A- E.NIDMENT-LABIILITY FOR DELAY-
A decision which has been awaited with-much interest and not a
little speculation has recently been handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The question was: Does the Carmack
Amendment I impose on the initial carrier liability for delay occur-
'Act of Feb. 4. 1887. c. 1m4. Sec. 2o, 24 Stat. 386, U. S. Comp. St. igoi,
p. 31(9. as amended by Act of June N9. 1i9o6; c. .9i. Sec. 7, 34 Stat. 593,
U. S. Comp. St. Supp, )(11 P. 1307. which provides in part: "That any com-
mon carrier receiving property for transportation from a .point in one state
to a point in another state, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and
shall he liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, dantage or injury to
such pr,,p'rty ,'aus,'d 1,1 it or by any common carrier . . . to which such
property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may
pass."
(494)
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ring on the line of its connection, without physical damage to the
property?
It was presented upon the following facts. A carload of straw-
berries was delivered by the shipper to a railroad company for
transportation front a point in Maryland to New York City. It
arrived at the destination sonic hours later than the customary time
of arrival, the price of berries having fallen in the meantime. The
defendant was sued aA the initial carrier under the Carmack Amend-
ment for the loss in price sustained and a verdict for the plaintiff
was upheld by the Court of Appeals of .Maryland.2  On appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States this decision was affirmed
and it was held that the loss of value resulting from the delay in
transit was within the purview of the provisions making the initial
carrier liable "'for loss, damage or injury to such property".3
The considerations which led to the adoption of the Carmack
Amendment were specifically pointed out in Atlantic Coast Line v.
Riverside .l1ills.4 Along with the single rate and the continuity of
carriage in through shipmpents, there had grown up the practice of
limiting the liability of each separate company to its own part of
the through route, and, as a result, the shipper could look to the
initial carrier for recompense only for loss, damage,-or delay oc-
curring on its own line. This burdensome situation was the matter
.which Congress undertook to regulate. Often it was difficult to
localize the cause of action and the shipper might be met with the
defense that the loss. injury, or delay did not occur on the line *of
the carrier he had sued. The initial carrier who had a through
route connection with the carrier on whose route the loss occurred,
could arrange a settlement inter se very easily, while the shipper
would be at heavy expense to sue a carrier thousands of miles away
perhaps. Thus the amendment was designed to secure the rights
of the shipper by securing "unity of transportation with unity of
responsibility".-
It was argued on behalf of the defendant in the case in ques-
tion that Congress had failed to accomplish this paramount object
and that the statute did not reach the case of a failure to transport
with reasonable despatch. It was contended that in such a case,
although there is a through shipment, the shipper must still look to
'122 Md. 215 (19T4).
"N. Y. P. & N. R. Co. v. Peninsula Produce Exchange of Maryland,
decided by the United States Supreme Court January 24, 1916. See also
"The Legal Intelligencer." Vol. LXXIII, p. 82, February 4, 1916.
'219 U. S. 186 (ig9J.
'The Md. Court (supra. note 2). said in part after pointing out the rea-
sons for the passage of the amendment: "The reason and policy of the Act
are sufficiently broad to include the liability here sought to be charged. The
remedies of the shippers in respect to losses of value from delay of transpor-
tation were subject to the same diversities and inconveniences as were those
relating to recovery for physical injury to the property accepted for carriage."
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the particular carrier whose neglect caused the delay. But the
court, speaking through 'Mr. Justice Hughes, said, "We do not
think that the language of the Amendment has the inadequacy
attributed to it. The words *any loss, damage or injury to such
property' caused by the initial carrier or by any connecting carrier
are comprehensive enough to embrace all damages resulting from
any failure to discharge a carrier's duty with respect to any part
of the transportation to the agreed destination." And in answer
to the contention that the only cases for which the statute provides
are those in which the commodities themselves become damaged,
that is, a physical damage, and that an impairment of value due to
delay while it occasions a loss to the owner, does not produce any
-loss, damage or injury to the property," the court said, "It is not
necessary, nor is it natural in view of the general purpose of the
statute, to take the words 'to the property' as limiting the word
'damage' as well as the word 'injury' and thus as rendering the
former wholly superfluous."
It was urged that the second paragraph of the amendment
puts beyond question the proposition that the loss, damage or injury
for which the initial carrier is made liable is loss, damage or injury
-which is sustained on the line of one of the carriers participating
in the transportation;O. that it was, therefore, loss, damage or
injury which may be localized and definitely ascertained to have
occurred while the property was in the possession of one or other
of the carriers; that physical loss, damage or injury was contem-
plated. But the court in disposing of this argument properly said,
"We find no difficulty in this, as the damages required to be paid
by the initial carrier are manifestly regarded as resulting from
some breach of duty, and the purpose is simply to provide for a
recovery against the connecting carrier if the latter, as to its part
of the transportation, is found to be guilty of that breach".7
It was said in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger.3 "The consti-
$This paragraph reads as follows: "That the common carrier .
issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the
common carrier . . . on whose line the loss, damage or injury shall
have been sustained, the amount of such loss, damage or injury as it may be
required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by. any
receipt, judgment or transcript thereof."
"Some state courts have passed upon this question and are not all in
accord. In the following decisions state courts have held the Carmack
Amendment applicable in cases of delay: Norfolk Truckers' Exchange v.
N. S. Ry. Co, 116 Va. 466 (1914); Fort Smith, etc., P. R. Co. v. Aubrey,
39 Okla. 270 (1913); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lyon, 66 So. 209 (Miss., 1914);
M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Carpenter, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 585 (igo8); Pecos, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Coxe, 'so S. W. 265 (Tex., 1912). On the other hand, in Gulf,
etc.. Rwy. Co. Y. Nelson, 139 S. W. 8i (Tex., 19t1), and in Byers v. Southern
Express Co., 165 N. C. 542 (1914), the amendment was held not to include
delay.
8226 U. S. 491 (1912).
_VOTES
tutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states
and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts
between the shipper and the carrier of an interstate shipment by
defining the liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage
to such property." It might be argued that the use of the word
"delay" indicates that the Supreme Court regarded that cause of
loss as a separate and distinct ground of liability, and that, as it is
not specifically mentioned in the Carmack Amendment, it should be
held to be excluded frolm, the remedy therein provided. But on the
other hand it seems more logical to presume that the court by its
use of the word intended to indicate its interpretation of the statute
and that it did apply to cases of delay.
This is particularly so in view of the Act of 1914.9 The court
in referring to that act said, "If the language of section twenty I?
can be regarded as ambiguous, this legislative interpretation of it
as conferring a right of action for delay, as well as for loss or in-
jury to the property in the course of transportation is entitled to
great weight.' It was argued that the Act of 1914 is not sub-
stantive but jurisdictional and cannot enlarge the substantive pro-
visions of the Carmack Amendment. This is untenable because the
act specifically refers to the Carmack Amendment and undoubtedly
assumes that cases of delay come within the purpose of the .act.
It does not enlarge the scope of the Carmack Amendment, but
merely intimates what the proper construction should be.
In view of the primary purpose of the act, it is submitted that
the Supreme Court has properly construed the words "loss, damage,
or injury to the property" as broad enough to cover a case of damage
to the shipper or owner by reason of delay. It would be a narrow
construction of the statute to confine its operation to the actual
loss of goods, or to their physical injury. As said in a Virginia
case,12 "The wrong for which the statute undertook to give a remedy
was that done to the shipper, and if the shipper has suffered loss
by reason of the negligent or unreasonable delay of the carrier in
the performance of its contract, it is just the same as though the
loss had resulted from a physical injury to the goods or from the
actual loss or disappearance of specific articles."
The effect of the principal case is obviously to overrule con-
Act of January 2o, 1914, c. z1, 38 Stat. 278. which provides, "that no
suit brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction against a railroad
company . . . to recover damages for delay. loss of or injury to prop-
erty received for transportation ly such common carrier under Sec. 20
of the act to regulate commerce . . . shall be removed to any court of
the United States where the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3oo."
" The Carmack Amendment.
"The court here cites Alexander v. Mayor. 5 Cranch I (U. S. i8og), and
Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682 (i89i).
'" Norfolk Truckers' Ex. v. Norfolk Co.. supra, note 7.
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trary decisions which have prevailed in some instances in the state
courts and to establish a uniform rule in suits under the Canack
Amendment, for delay in interstate shipments.2
3
L. IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL L.tw-TiiE CONSTITUTIONALITY' OF THE
FEDERAL I NCO.ME TAX OF 1913 '-The opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States recently handed down in Brusiaber v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co.,- in upholding the validity of the most
recent income tax law under the Sixteenth Amendment, marks the
termination of long-continued attempts on the part of Congress to
bring within the taxing power of the United States the productive
field of private incomes, with the final triumph of such Congressional
legislation. In view of the general public importance of the present
act, a brief review of its predecessors and the constitutional ob-
stacles encountered by them is perhaps not inappropriate.
The income tax is of ancient origin -' and was discussed early
in the constitutional history of the United States. In 1812 a pro-
posed tax on incomes was rendered unnecessary by the early termin-
ation of the war with England.4  In 186i a tax upon all incomes
in excess of eight hundred dollars was imposed by the
Direct Property Tax Act-, which apparently was never
collected and was repealed a year later by the Act of 186-"
which imposed a graduated tax with a minimum exemption of six
hundred dollars. By the Act of 1864- the rate of taxation was
increased, and in 1865 1 an act was passed amending the Act of
1864. By the Act of 18671 the progressive tax was repealed and
a tax of five per cent. on the excess of incomes over one thousand
dollars until 187o was imposed. In i87o the tax was reduced for
one year and upon its expiration, in 1871, it was not re-enacted.
For nearly twenty-five years thereafter there was no further
legislation on the subject. It remained for the Act of 1894 1' to
" For a discussion of the principal case when first decided by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, see 62 UNIV. OF PENX-A. L REv., 727 (1914).
'Act of Oct. 3. 1913 (Sec. II, Ch. 16; 38 Stat. at L, 166).
'Decided Jan. 24, i916.
'There is evidence that such taxes existed as early as i58o B. C For
a discussion of the early history of income taxes with authorities, see Fosters
"Income Tax," 2 ed. (1915), Sec. i.
'Seligman. Income Tax. 430.
'Act of Aug. 5, 1861. 12 Stat. at L., Chap. 45, P. 309, Sec..49-5t.
'Act of July I. 1862: 12 Stat. at L., Ch. 119. p. 473. Sec. 89-93.
*Act of June 3o. 1'4: 13 Stat. at L. Ch. 173. p. 281 ; Sec. 116-123.
'Act of .Mar. 3. 186,. 13 Stat. at L. Ch. 78. p. 479. Sec. i.
'Act of Mar. 2. iN67; 14 Stat. at L, Ch. i69, p. 477.
"Act of Aug. 27. iF,' : 28 Stat, at L. Ch. 349. p. 5o9.
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bring the issue of the constitutionality of such taxation again before
the court and to start the agitation that terminaed in the adoption
of the Sixteenth Amendment. The task of attacking the act at that
time seemed a formidable one. The numerous statutes of the same
type, alread- mentioned. which had preceded it, had been generally
acquiesced in and assumed to be constitutional. In ltvon v. United
States."' it was strongly intimated by the court that direct taxes,
%%ithin the constitutional requirement of apportionment, included
taxes on land and capitation taxes, and no others. Furthermore in
Springer v. United Stets.12 a case arising out of an attempt to
collect the income tax imposed by the Act of 1865 13 it was held
that the tax was constitutional. Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering
the opinion of the court, said: "Our conclusions are that direct
laxes, within the meaning of the Constitution. are only capitation
taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate", 
4
Text writers at this time were unanimous in the view that
direct taxes in the constitutional sense referred to poll taxes and
taxes on land exclusively.7" Such was the situation when the con-
stitutionality of the Act of i,')4 came before the Supreme Court in
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. 6  The only difference be-
tween this and the apparently unobjectionable Act of 1865 which
had aroused no opposition was not a difference in principle, but
merely a material increase of the exemption from six hundred to
four thousand dollars. as a result of which the burden of more than
four-fifths of the tax under the latter act fell upon four states.t
In view of this trend of authority one would have expected to have
seen the validity of tle Act of 1894 upheld. The court, however,
held that a tax upon the income from personal or real property was
in reality .and in substance a tax upon the pioperty itself; that it
was a tax upon property solely because of one's general ownership
therein: and that the tax on income derived from such property,
real or personal. was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the
property from which the income was derived and hence must be
apportioned."s The court disposed of the Springer case by saying
213 Dallas, 171 (1g6).
22 io2 V. S. :;86 088o).
"Supra. notes 7 and &
"See Willoughby. Constitutional Law, vol. i. p. 616. For a valuable
discussion of the historical reason for this decision see note in Thayer's
Cases on Constitutional Law. part 3, p. 1325.
Cooley. Constitutional Limitations. 5th ed, p. ;95; Hare, American
Contitutional Law. vol. 1. p. .4,o; Foster & Abbott.. Income Tax Law of
1894, p. 14.
" *7 U. S. 420 t()1:): same case on rehearing. zs8 U. S. 6ot (x895).
" New York. New Jersey. Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. See Fos-
ter's Income Tax. sUpra. note- 3. P. 30.
" For an interesting historical discussion maintaining that the introduc-
tion of the words "direct taxe," in the Constitution had no reference to any
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that in that case, as disclosed by the record, the income was derived
not from real estate, but was in part professional, as an attorney-
at-law, and the remainder interest on United States bonds; and that
a tax on professional receipts might be treated as an excise or duty,
and therefore indirect, while at the-same time a tax on the income of
personalty might be held to be direct." Mr. Justice \hite and Mr.
Justice t Jarlan dissented, holding that a tax on net income, after
losses, repairs, exemptions, etc., had been deducted, did not, to the
extent that real estate revenues may have entered into the gross
income, constitute a direct tax on the land itself.
It is perhaps fortunate that this most lucrative form of fed-
eral taxation was not earlier arrested by judicial action, as its dis-
continuance either during the Civil War or immediately following
it might have proved disastrous. The decision in the Pollock case
clearly came into conflict with the then seffled ideas as to the con-
stitutionality of an unapportioned income tax. The result of the
discussion. aroused by this decision was the Sixteenth Amendment '-
which was designed to remove the constitutional objections to such
taxation.
It remains to consider the objections to the constitutionality
of the Act of 1913 as raised and disposed of in Brushabcr v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co.21  Foremost in importance among them was
the contention that the Sixteenth Amendment provided a new and
hitherto unknown power of taxation, a power to levy an income
tax which though direct would be unrestricted by the requirement
of apportionment to which direct taxes are ordinarily subject. It
was further urged that under this newly created power of taxation
there must be intrinsic (not geographical) uniformity and likewise
that the authorization of a tax upon incomes "from whatever source
derived" prevents by implication the exclusion from taxation of
any persons or classes. Pursuing further this course of reasoning
it was contended that the system of progressive taxation provided
bv the act as well as the exemption of certain organizations from
all taxation under it, violated the two requirements stated above,
removed the act from the protection of the Sixteenth Amendment,
leaving the tax like any other direct tax, void because unappor-
tioned.
It is in reply to this contention that Mr. Chief Justice White
dispute over tax matters; "but was designed solely to solve the difficulty con-
nected with representation," which, according to the original notion, was
to be apportioned according to wealth, as well as population, and contending
that the court was misled in its historical interpretation in the Pollock
case; see Seligman, Income Tax, pp. 548 et seq.
"Supra, note 2.
" It provides: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without aplortionment among the
several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
:z Supra. note 2.
NOTES
points out the precise effect of the Sixteenth Amendment upon such
legislation. The income taxes imposed during the Civil War period
were unquestionably considered under the class of excises, duties,
and imposts and not as direct taxes. The Pollock case merely held
that from the point of substance to burden-income by a tax was to
burden the property from which the income was derived, and thus
accomplish the very thing which the provision for the apportion-
ment of direct taxes was adopted to prevent. It did not hold that
income taxes were genetricallv or necessarily direct taxes, but
recognizing that they were in their nature excises, required appor-
tionment only when they in substance brought about the result which
the rule as to apportionment in direct taxation was designed to
prevent. The whole purpose, therefore, of the amendment was "to
relieve all income taxes when imposed. from apportionment from
a consideration of the source whence the income is derived." It
could hardly be asserted that it was intended by the amendment to
create an entirely new form of taxation which, neither direct nor
an excise, should be free alike from the restraints of apportionment
and uniformity. The true effect of the amendment is to prevent
the application of the rule of the Pollock case by which alone the
income tax was removed from the great class of excises, duties, and
imposts, and placed under the class of direct taxes; that is, the
prohibition of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income
was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to become
a direct tax on the source itself.
Among the numerous other objections to the constitutionality
of the act to which the court gave less advertence were the con-
tentions that because of its exemptions and progressive features it
was a tax based upon wealth alone and therefore repugnant to the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; that as the act pro-
vided for the collection of the tax at the source it imposed a burden
of expense upon corporations in violation of the due process clause;
that as this deduction was required only upon coupon and regis-
tered bonds, corporations indebted on such bonds as well as the
holders thereof were discriminated against; that the difference in
the amount of exemption allowed married and 'single persons
amounted to an unjust discrimination; and that owners of houses
in which they live are not compelled to add the rental value nor are
those living in rented houses permitted to deduct the rent in arriving
at the amount of taxable income.22
Having characterized these latter objections as "numerous and
minute. not to say in some respects hypercritical" the court some-
what summarily but nevertheless conclusively disposed of them by
referring to a few acknowledged propositions of constitutional law.
For a discussion of most of the constitutional points raised in this
opinion, as well as several minor possibilities niot touched upon in the prin-
cipal case, see Foster's Income Tax of 1913. supra, note 3, p. 27.
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As to the alleged lack of uniformity, it is settled that the uniformity
required by the Constitution is geographical merelV. : 3 As to the
alleged violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
this amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power of Con-
gress . 4  The court said, however, that there might be a classifica-
tion so arbitrary as to indicate that it was a mere confiscation of
property under the guise of taxation, in which case the court would
hold'it a violation of the Fifth Amendment. But the classifications
and progressive provisions of this act were clearly not open to that
objection.
The principal case vindicates the general belief that had previ-
ouslv existed that the Sixteenth Amendment had made possible an
effective, non-apportioned income tax, with appropriate exemptions.
which the relatively unequal distribution of population and wealth
under the former necessity of apportionment had made impracti-
able.2 s By it, likewise, the several possible obpections to the con-
stitutionalitv of such an act that have at various times been sug-
gested, are, for the most part, laid at rest.
B. M. K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-W IIAT 1. TIE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTI-
FICATION FOR THE HARRISON ANTI-NARCOTIC -L.w?-The Act of
Congress generally known as the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Law I has
been the occasion of much discussion among students of constitu-
tional law, but it still remains to be determined upon what authority
in the Constitution can Congress rely for the power to enact such a
statute.
The act provides that every person who "produces. imports,
manufactures, compounds, deals in, dispenses, sells, distributes, or
gives away" opium or coca leaves or their derivatives shall register
with the Collector of Internal Revenue and pay a tax of one dollar
per annim . All sales, etc.. are unlawful unless upon written order
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and all persons dis-
tributing the drug on such orders and all physicians, dentists, and
veterinarians distributing the drugs to their patients, must keep a
record of all drugs dispensed for two years.
Section eight of the act provides as follows: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person not registered under tile provisions of this
act, and who has not paid the special tax provided for by this act. to
Knowlton v. Moore. 178 U. S. 49 (9oo).
'Flut v. Stone-Tracy Co.. 2,o U. S. toT, 158 (1013).
' This is well illustrated by the fact that during the first year of the
enforcement of time Act of tota. New York. Pennsylvania and Illinois paid
more than half the total income tax collected. See Foster's Income Tax
.f Ii.3. supra. note 3. p. ,6.
I; . tatntes at l.arge. i5. c. .. approved January 2. jot5.
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have in his possession or under his control any of the aforesaid
drugs: and such possession or control shall be presumptive evidence
of a violation of this section and also a violation of section one of
this act." Any person violating any requirement of the act is sub-
ject to a fine of not more than $2o0o or imprisonment for not more
than five years or both.
The question is upon what principles of constitutional law* can
the act be upheld.
Several cases already have arisen under the act. " In United
States v. Brown.2 it wai argued that section eight is unconstitu-
tional in that it is an attempt on the part of Congress to encroach
upon the police power of the several states; that the only right Con-
gress has to control the sale of a commodity, within the provisions
of the Constitution, is (i) to regulate commerce (2) the right of
taxation; and that neither of these rights is invoked by section eight
But tle court upheld the act and said, "The court will take judicial
notice of the fact, that no opium is grown or produced in this coun-
try, and that the purpose of the act is to prohibit the importation
of opium . . . Congress, having the power to exclude the
drug entirely from the United States, and the right to regulate
its relation to interstate commerce, and to levy a tax, must be held
to have the right to make it unlawful for any person who has not
complied with the provisions of the act by registration or paying
a tax. to have in his possession this 'outlawed' article." 3
It is submitted that the act as a whole, cannot be sustained as
an exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce for the
reason that it applies in broad terms to "every person who produces,
imports, manufactures, compounds, deals in, dispenses. sells, dis-
tributes or gives away" opium, and is not limited to interstate trans-
actions. It was clearly not the intent of Congress to limit the
application of the act to interstate commerce and if this be true,
it cannot be sustained as a regulation of interstate commerce under
the so-called "original package rule"4
'Moreover, it is clear that the act was intended as an exercise
of the power of Congress to lay and collect taxes. This is evidenced
225 Fed. 135 (x5).
'Other recent cases are: United States v. Woods, a2 Fed. 278 (igis);
United States v. Wilson. 225 Fed. 82 (igi) ; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy.
225 Fed. ioo3- (ioi5). These cases have held that the act does not apply
to those who have possession of the drugs for their own use but only to
those who have them in their possession for purposes of Sec. i of the act.
'"\Vhcre it has been found necessary to decide the boundary of Federal
authority it has heen generally held that. where goods prepared and packed
for shipment in interstate commerce are transported in such commerce
delivered to the consignee and the 'ackage by him separated into its com-
ponent parts, the power of Federal regulation ceased and that of the State
may he asserted." Grady v. Wis-onsin. 228 U. S. i5 (1913); Brown v.
Maryland. 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
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in the title, "An act to provide for the registration of, with col-
lectors of internal revenue and to impose a special tax upon all
persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in,
dispense. sell. distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their
salts, derivatives or preparations, and for other purposes." In con-
sidering its constitutionality as an exercise of the power of taxation,
it must be borne in mind that "the government of the United States
can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution
and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given
or given by necessary implication". 5 As the federal government
has no power to establish mere police recgulations within the states,
the question is whether the regulations prescribed in the act are
appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying into execution
the power of laying and collecting taxes, i.- e., whether they are
appropriate in any degree, for as was said by Chief Justice Marshall,
"when the law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect
any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here
to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department. and to tread on legis-
lative ground".?
In the light of the Lottery, White Slave,9 .and Pure Food
cases, 0 it may now be regarded as settled that Congress can enact
police regulations as the means of exercising its control over inter-
state commerce. Therefore, it might be argued that, as Congress"
has the power to lay hold of the commerce power for purposes of
police, it can do likewise with the taxing power. But it is sug-
gested that, so far, all the police measures sustained as an exercise
of the commerce power, have been regulations of the outlawed
article affecting its transportation in interstate commerce which the
states could not regulate and consequently there was no encroach-
ment upon the police power of the states. But the power of regu-
lating the intrastate distribution of opium does rest in the states
and an attempt on the part of Congress to regulate it. necessarily
conflicts with the police power of the states and can only be sus-
tained if it is'an appropriate means of exercising one of the express
powers of Congress. in this case the power of taxation.
But, upon a careful reading of the Harrison Act. it would seem
that the primary end sought to he accomplished by Congress is the
regulation of the opium traffic and not the collection of the tax of
one dollar per annimi. Whether the regulation of the opium busi-
'Marshall, C. J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, x Wheaton 304 (x86).
'Cooley. Constitutional Limitations. 6th Ed., p. 7o6; Keller v. U. S.,
213 U. S. 138 (1908).
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (18ig).
'Lottery Case. 188 U. S. 121 (z9o3).
'Hoke v. U S.. 227 U. S. .08 (1912).
"Illpolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 22 U. S. 45 (1911).
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ness is not too remote an aid to the taxing power to justify its inter-
ference with the police power of the states remains to be decided.
In several cases the effect of Revenue Acts of Congress upon the
police power of the states has conic before the Supreme Court..
Notable among these is the case of United States v. DeII'itt," where
Congress imposed a tax upon a certain kind of oil and made
it a misdemeanor to sell a certain other kind of oil. Because the
relation of this prohibition to the power of taxation, if any, was
merely that of increasing. the production of other oils on which the
tax was laid. it was held to be too remote an aid to the taxing power,
and. as a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade
of the states, to have no constitutional operation within state limits.
In the License Tax cases12 Congress had imposed a "license tax"
upon certain busin6sses. It was held that the license gave no author-
ity to the licensee to carry on the business within a state, that Con-
gress cannot authorize a business for the purpose of taxing it
because that is too remote an aid to the power to lay and collect
taxes and is repugnant to the exclusive power of the states over the
same subject.
It would seem to be difficult to hold the regulations of the
I larrison Act not to be in conflict with the exclusive power of the
states over the same subject in the light of these decisions. If these
regulations of the opium traffic and its distribution can be sustained
as a means of laying and collecting taxes, what is without the scope
of the power of Congress to regulate through the medium of the
taxing power?
R. H. IV.
IASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPExSATION LAw-
DOES A PUBLIC CHARITY FALL WITHIN TIE SCOPE OF THE PENN-
SYLVANIA Acr?-One of the most important questions which has
been raised by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act,
which has now been in operation for two months, and a question
which is bound to give 'ccasion to no little amount of discussion
when it comes finally before the courts, is the question whether a
public charity comes within the provisions of the act. -Also if it
does. but elects to reject the act. which all employers are permitted
to do, is it liable in an action for damages in the same degree as
before the passage of the act, which was no liability at all. or is a
greater degree of responsibility imposed by the new legislation?
This question has not vet come before the courts-even those
of ori.inal jurisdiction. However, there is a recent ruling
of the Workmen's Compensation Board to the effect that "charitable
119 Wall., 41 (1869).
'25 Wall. 462 (I66).
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corporations, colleges, hospitals, etc.. being corporations not for
profit. are employers within the meaning of the act and if they do
not give to their employes the notices provided in Section 302
they will be liable for compensation under Article 1II"., But tile
IBoard has refused to rule as to the liability under Article 1I of a
charitable corporation which rejects Article 111. holding tile ques-
tion to be one **for (letcriination of the courts and not tile Board".
This, in view of the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts before the
passage of the act to the effect that charitable institutions cannot
he held liable for the negligence of their servants, presents a most
interesting )roblem. The two important questions are first, whether
a 'liarit:tlle corporation is compelled to insure its employees, pro-
vided it does not reject Article II. and second, what is its liability
at law if it does reject.
The main factors to be considered are the principles of statu-
tory construction as laid down in Pennsylvania and the construction
placed upon compensation acts in other states, the general purpose
of the act. and the liability of such institutions at common law-be-
fore the act was passed.
While Pennsylvania has always adhered to the general principle
that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
construed. remedial statutes have, at the same time, been liberally
construed, in order to effectuate their purpose. In Kein v. City
of IRcading.*2 the former rule is stated as follows: "The inference
to abrogate this common law rule is not nearly so strong as the
inference of an intent not to do so. to be drawn from the omission
to declare, as could have been done in two or three words".3 The
latter principle is laid down in Hartman's Appeal 4 thus: "'The stat-
ute, it is true. is remedial, and although in derogation of the com-
mon law and ill some sense against common right, it is entitled to a
fair interpretation in advancement of the remedy provided"."
\Vith the exception of 'Michigan, all states have construed
workinen's compensation acts liberally. "Tile common rule as to
construing legislation in derogation of the common law strictly
against a purpose to change it has little or no application to the
efforts to create a new system for dealing with personal injuries to
emploves". t
Rule 7. P. 12. Bulletin No. 2. issued by the \Vorkrnen's Compensation
foard. Feb. ior6.
Super. Ct. 613 (Pa. 1907).
'See also Johnston's Estate. 33 Pa. ;it ( 1089). and Petit v. Lutz's Execu-
tor. 33 Pa. 118 (18.O).
io• PO a. 3-27 (1884) -
"ee 11m,, 'amn's \!-peal. 62 Pa. 417 ( 1S6f).
Andre Jwski v. \ olvcrihe Coal Co.. 149 N. W. 6R4 (IMich.. I194).
'Sadowski v. Thomas Furniace Co.. 146 X. W. 7o (\X'is.. :914): see
al-, 'oing v. Duncan. 'i N. F I (Mass.. 1014). and Appeal of Hotel
-Bond Co.. q3 Al. 24. (Conm.. m0is).
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"The conditions giving rise to a law, the faults to be remedied,
the aspirations evidently intended to be efficiently embodied in the
enactment, and the effects and consequences as regards responding
to the prevailing conception of the necessities of public welfare
play an important part in shaping the proper administration of the
legislation." ' The purpose of the act is to create a system whereby
the recovery 1 an eniployee of (lanages for an injury received in
the course of his employment shall not be based upon any idea of
negligence but upon thetprinciple that injuries are a necessary and
inevitable result of the carrying on of any business or work and
that damages for such injuries are as much a legitimate part of the
expense of such business as wages, improvements, moneys expended
as a result of depreciation or loss by fire, etc.
But the real difficulty will be to get away from the Pennsyl-
vania decisions on the liability of charities for the negligen ce of their
servants. The leading case is Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd,9 in
which no recovery was allowed for the death of the plaintiff's
intestate, caused by the negligence of certain patrolmen in dropping
a heavy tarpaulin upon him from a fourth story window. After
holding that the patrol was a public charity, 'Mr. Justice Paxson
went on to say that it had "no property or funds which have not
been contributed for the purpose of charity, and it would be against
all law and equity to take those trust funds so contributed for a
special, charitable purpose, to compensate injuries inflicted or oc-
casioned by the negligence of the agents or servants of the patrol."
This so-called "trust fund" theory was reaffirmed in Gable v.
Sisters of St. Francis.' where a patient in a hospital was injured
by scalding water that escaped from a hot water bottle because of
the negligence of a nurse. The court said: "The doctrine *rests
fundamentally on the fact that such liability if allowed, would lead
inevitably to a diversion of the trust funds from the trust's pur-
poses."
But in lVincinore v. Philadelphia," where a stranger was in-
jured through the negligence of the operator of an elevator in a
large office building owned by the city as trustee of the Girard
Estate. recovery was allowed and this case was distinguished from
the Fire Patrol case on the ground that here "the act of negligence
was committed by one having no connection with the charity, save
only that he was assisting in the work of making income from prop-
crtv that was not devoted to charity."This "trust fund" theory, whicfh is applied in Pennsylvania, has
been severely criticized, both in regard to the authenticity of its.
"'Milwaukee v. Miller. 144 N. W. 188 (Wis.. 1913).
2 man Pa. 624 (18&M).
P227 a. 25- (1910).
j8 Pa. Super. Ct. 625 (t902).
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origin I: and by reason of the failure to apply it consistently. The
cases which rely upon it almost unanimously state that while
the charity is not liable for the negligence of its servants, it would
be liable for the failure to exercise due care and skill in selecting
its servants." The great majority of jurisdictions allow a recovery
to strangers and employees, but refuse it to patients, on the theory
that one who accepts the benefit either of a public or of a private
charity is estopped from holding his benefactor liable for the negli-
gence of his servants in administering the charity."
The parts of the P'ennsylvania Act 1' involved in this discussion
are Sections 103 and 202. Section io3 reads: "The tern "employer'
as used in this act is declared to be synonymous with master and
to include natural persons, )artnerships, joint-stock companies,
corporations for profit, corporations not for profit, municipal cor-
porations, the Commonwealth, and all governmental agencies cre-
ated by it." The phrase "corporations not for profit" immediately
brings to mind the classification of the Corporation Act of i874,
a"
under which the second division of corporations not for profit are
those for "'the support of any benevolent, charitable, educational
or missionary undertaking." This is the basis of the ruling made
by the \\'ork-men's Compensation Board. The argument against
thiis ruling, based upon Kcim v. Reading 17 and Fire Patrol v.
Bovd," is that if charities had been intended to be included within
the scope of the act, they would have been specifically mentioned
in Section io3."9 The supporters of this view point to other in-
stances in which charities have been favored by the law, such as
their exemption from taxation. ' the non-applicability of the rule
against perpetuities,2' etc. lowever, it should be noted that all
restrictions placed upon the purview of the act have been made in
I'llearns v. Waterbury Hospital. 66 Coin. 8 95'). See also article
by lion. Joiin Marshall Gest. Public Charities and the Rule of Respondeat
Superior, 3"- Am. Law. Reg. 669: and a reply thereto by Hon. Richard C.
McMurtrie, 38 Am. Law Reg. 209.
"Kellogg v. Church Foundation. 112 N. Y. Supp. 566 (ito8); St. Paul's
Sanitarium v. Williamson. 164 S. NV. 36 (Tex., 1914); 111. Central R. R. v.
Buchanan. io3 S. IV. 272 (Ky., 1907).
"Powers v. Massachusetts Ilospital. 47 C. C. A. 133 (1901). See also
Bruce v. M. F,. Church. 147 Mich. 230 (1907); Basabo v. Salvation Army.
8s .-tl. i-O (R. I, 1912); Hospital of St. Vincent de Paul v. Thompson,
91 S. E. 13 (Va., 1914).
":Act of June 2. 1915. P. L 736.
'Act of April 29. 1874. P. L 73.
"Supra, note 2.
"Supra. note 6.
"See article by IHenry A. Hoefler. Esq.. in "The Legal Intelligencer,"
Vol. 73. No. 2 P. 26.
Northampton County v. Lafayette College. 1-o Pa. 132 (889).
' Biscoe v. Thweatt. 74 Ark. ;45 (io5l.
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the emuneration of employes and not in the emuneration of em-
ployers.
22
Section 202 reads: "The employer shall be liable for the neg-
ligence of all employes while acting within the scope of their em-
ployment, including engineers, chauffeurs, miners, mine-foremen.
. . . and all other employes licensed by the State or other
governmental authority, if the employer be allowed by law the
right of free selection of such employes from the class of persons
thus licensed." It has been strenuously argued that thissection was
embodied in the act nmeretv for the purpose of overruling the so-
called "mine-foremen" cases and that the enumeration after" the
word "including" is explanatory and restrictive, thus limiting the
scope of the section. It is submitted, however, that the section is
general and includes "all employes", on the ground that by taking
away the old defenses available to the employer, the legislature
has shown its intention to be that the difference between the remedy
at law and under the act should be as small as possible and that the
principle of compensation should be incorporated into the common
law to as great a degree as possible, superseding the old idea of
negligence. Under this view, the enumeration following the word
"including" is merely surplusage and added to remove all doubt
as to the overruling of the "mine-foremen" cases.
Section 20i, which abolishes the defenses of contributory neg-
ligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow-
servant, is not difficult of construction after the two-sections just
discussed have been disposed of. The defenses have been abolished
as to every action by an employe for injuries received by him in
the course of his employment, which lie might bring either by
reason of the common law before the act or by virtue of an ex-
tension of the remedy at law under the act, if there be any. If no
action lies, the abolition of the defense is of no consequence.
P. C.'W.
TORTS-LIAILITY OF CITIES AND COUNTIES FOR FAiLURE T0
REPAIR HIGHWAYS AxD BmIDEs-Although there is some authority
to support a contrary doctrine, the great weight of opinion is in
favor of the view that for failure to keep highways and bridges
in repair there is an implied common law liability for resulting
damages, resting upon every chartered municipality.'
The courts of New England are the chief upholders of the
theory that no such liability attaches even to a chartered city unless
Section 1o4, supra. note 16: see also Act of June 3, 1915, P. L 777.
District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450 (mSF9); City of
Muncie v. Hey. 164 Ind. 57o (igo5); Brewer v. New York, 52 N. Y. S. 86%
(1898).
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such liability is expressly imposed by statute.! In Hill v. Boston,"
Mr. Chief )ustice Gray said, "A duty which is imposed upon an
incorporated city as the representative and agent of the public, and
for the public benefit, and by a general law applicable to all cities
and towns in the Commonwealth, is a duty owing to the public
alone, and a breach thereof by a city, is to be redressed by a prose-
cution in behalf of the public, and will not support an action by
an individual, even if lie sustains special damage thereby."
In a review of the earliest English authorities he pointed out
that there are in the books many cases of indictment for neglect
to repair highways and bridges and none for damages for injuries
sustained by such neglect. This argument, however, cannot be
sustained in view of the statement in the early English case of
Thomas v. Sorrell,4 where -Ir. Chief justice Vaughan said, "If a
particular person or body corporate, be to repair a certain highway
or a bridge, and a man is endamaged particularly by the ponder-
ousness of the way. or decay of the bridge, he may have his action
against the person or body corporate -who ought to repair, for
his damage." Mr. justice Gray cited the case of Russell v. Men
of Dcvon -, to sustain his conclisions, but the later English cases
point out that that case is not an authority upon the question of
the liability of an incorporated municipality, but simply establishes
the rule that no action can be brought against the inhabitants of a
parish for failure to repair a highway or bridge.s
New Jersey - and a few other jurisdictions are in accord with
the view of the New England Courts.t
The courts following the majority view, that a municipal cor-
poration is liable for neglect of duty in respect to highways, base
their reasoning upon the ground that when muniipal'corporations
are invested with exclusive authority and control over streets and
bridges within their corporate limits with ample power of raising
money for their construction, improvement, and repair, a duty
arises to the public from the nature of the powers granted, to keep
the avenues of travel within such jurisdiction in a reasonably safe
condition, and a corresponding liability rests upon the corporation
to respond in damages to those injured by a neglect to perform that
duty.
Although the weight of authority makes chartered inunicipali-
'Beardsly* v. Hartford,.so Conn. 5-9 (1883); Aldrick v. Gorham, 77
Me. 28 (- 8)
122 Mass. 344 (1877).
4Vaughan, 330 (1677), at page 340.
62 Term. Rep. 667 (1788).
' Kent v. Worthington Local Board L R., 1o Q. B. D. 121 (1882);
llartnell v. Ryde Commissioners. 4 B. & S. 361 (1863).
'Wild v. Paterson. 47 N. J. L 4o6 (1886).
'Weltz v. Tilden. 77 Wis. 152 (i8to) ; Petrit Y. Blackley, 21 Mich. 84
18o9. In both states the liability was subsequently imposed by statute.
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ties liable for negligence in regard to highways and bridges under
.their control, vet it frees quasi corporations, such as counties, from
soch liabilities unless it is imposed by statute, even though it is the
duty of the county to repair.:' The courts seeni to look upon these
quasi corporations as primarily and distinctively state instrumental-
ities and to regard the prerogative of partaking of the state's exemp-
tion from liability in respect of the exercise of all of its public
functions and duties witlhuut exception, as one which naturally
grows out of the manner and objects of their creation. They regard
niunicipal corporations as voluntary associations created and or-
ganized at the solicitation of the inhabitants and with their free
consent, under the laws of the state, but counties as created by the
sovereigni power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the
particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the people
who inhabit themt. Another reason advanced is that as a county is
but a political sub-division of the state, a suit against a county is.
in effect, a suit against the state. In this connection it is interesting
to note the recent case of Mobile County v. Maddo.t'0 ° where the
court adhered to this distinction.
It is submitted that the above theories do not state any satis-
factory reason why a city should be liable to an action, and a
county not liable under like circumstances. The ground of the
action is the failure on the part of the corporation to perform a
duty imiposed upon it by law, whereby the party suing is injured.
It seens that the niethod of the creation of the corporation cannot
be decisive as to the question of liability. A county is created by the
sovereign power of the state: a city cannot be created otherwise
than by the same sovereign power of the state. The question of the
liability of the corporation, for failure to perform a duty imposed by
law, cannot be made to depend upon the question whether it was'
organized by the act and consent of the people inhabiting the ter-
ritory or was superinposed by law, without such consent.
On the whole no substantial'difference can be perceived between
the duty of a county to keep its roads in repair, and the duty of a
city to keep its streets in repair, so far as the general public is con-
cerned. Both are matters of public interest, and controlled by the
general policy of the state. And in both instances there is the ad-
mitted duty to keep in repair.
In Pennsylvania the liability of a city for injuries resulting
froni the neglect of the duty to repair its highways and bridges
seens never to have been seriously questioned*" In Briegal v.
Philadelphia 12 the court recognized the distinction between the
I lollenbeck v. Winnebago County. 95 Ill. 148 (i8$o ; Commissioners v.
Reinier, ig Ind. App. ii9 i897).
"7o So. 2r9 (Ala.. 1915).
" llev v. Philadelphia. 8i Pa. 44 (18;6): Preston v. Philadelphia, .249
Pa. 266 (115).
U 135 Pa. 451 (189).
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liability of municipal corporations in the proper sense, and quasi
corporations. In Bucher v. Northumberland County 13 it was held
that there is no common law obligation upon counties to repair
highways or bridges within their limits. So in Pennsylvania one
must look to the statutes to find the duty of a county to repair its
highways or bridges.
The Act of June 26, 189524 and its supplements have conferred
upon counties power to improve any public road or highway within
their limits, and have provided that any road or highway constructed
or improved under the provisions thereof should forever thereafter
be a county road, l e duiy of keeping and maintaining the same to
devolve upon the -ounty, at its expense. It has been held that from
the duty to repair such roads, imposed upon the counties by these
acts there is implied a liability for damages resulting from neglect
of that duty."
The Act of March 30, i9o5,10 provides: "It shall be the duty
of the county commissioners of the several counties of this Common-
wealth to repair all county bridges, heretofore erected or to be
hereafter erected by the county, and to pay all expenses of such
repairs out of the county treasury in the usual manner." Under this
act the court said in Gehringcr v. Lehigh County 7 "Although
counties are not by this statute expressly made liable for injuries
resulting from neglect properly to maintain their bridges, yet a
mandate to repair carries with it a responsibility, which. if neglected,
may give rise to such a liability."
It is submitted that under these decisions the law of Pennsyl-
vania is that once the legislature has placed upon a county the
duty to keep in repair a highway, bridge or public building, then
the county is liable for damages resulting from a neglect of that
duty.
G.F.D.
VILLS-SOLDIERS' AND SEAMEN'S WILLs-One result of the
present European War has been to emphasize the rule, which always
has prevailed generallyj that the wills of soldiers and sailors need
not conform to the requirements of ordinary wills. The English
Statute of Frauds' provided that notwithstanding the act, "any
soldier being in actual military -service, or any manriner or seaman
being at sea, may dispose of his movables, wages, and personal
estate as he or they might have done before the making of this
332oW Pa. 618 (xgo4).
14 P. L 336.
'3 Bunting v. County of Allegheny. 6o Pitts. 312 (Pa., 1912).
"P. L 8.
"231 Pa, 497 (191t).
'Stat. -() Cai. II. c. 3, Sec. 23 (1676-77).
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act." This exception was preserved in the Wills Act of 1837,2
and is in force in most of the states of this'country. Similar pro-
visions exist in nearly the whole of modern Continental Europe.
In general, therefore, the oral wills of soldiers and seamen
are recognized as valid without subsequent reduction to writing.
without any specified number of witnesses, and without being made
in extremis. The reason for the exception seems to be the constant
danger to which such persons are subjected, and their frequent in-
ability to find the time or the means of making a deliberate written
will. 3 It should be noted, however, that the language of the Statute
of Frauds and of statutes based upon it applies only to the personal
property of soldiers and sailors, and not to their real estate.
The statutes for the most part use the terms "soldier being in
actual military service", and "mariner being at sea", but the courts
as a rule have been liberal in construing these terms.4 Occasionally,
however, a difficult case arises. Such a problem has recently
come before the Chancery Division in England. where the question
was whether a certain will was made by a soldier while "in actual
military service." The testator was a lieutenant in the Indian Army,'
and in 1895 took part in certain frontier operations in Waziristan.
The government distributed the war medals on March 13, 1895,
and for the purpose of the distribution the Waziristan operations
were regarded as having ended on that date. However, certain
troops were left behind in the Tochi Valley as an escort to the de-
limitation party which fixed the frontier limits. The testator be-
longed to this escort, which was styled the "Tochi Delimitation Es-
cort"; and while so engaged, was mortally wounded by a fanatic
on May 14, 1895. Prior to his death he made a soldier's will, ac-
cording to the provisions of the Efiglish Wills Act.' It was con-
tended that he was not in actual military service Within the mean-s
ing of the Wills Act at the time the will was made, since peace was
declared s6nie months previously, and the delimitation of the
frontier was merely one of the necessary duties connected with the
terms of peace. The decision was, however, that the will was made
while the iestator was "in actual military service".
The privilege granted the wills of soldiers is derived from the
Roman law, and the phrase "being in actual military service" is
'Stat. I Vict. c. 26, Sec. IT (1837).
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Barb. 148 (N. Y. i85z)
'The term "soldier" as thus applied includes all ranks, officers and
privates, regulars and volunteers, provided they are "in actual military
service." Spratt's Goods (18r,). p. 28 (Eng., j896) ; Leathers v. Greenacre, 53
Maine 561 (S6'0). Likewise "seaman" or "mariner" includes all persons
engaged on shipboard, whether in the naval or merchant service, for the
purposes of the voyage-engineers, firemen, pursers, cooks, stewards, sur-
geons and chaplains. E.r parte Thompson, 4 Bradf. 154 (N. Y., 1856).
'Stepra, note 2.
$Re Limond. 113 L. T. 8TS (Fng.. 19TB).
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generally regarded as the equivalent of the civil law term in e.r-
pcditioize.7 The term "expedition", however, is not to be confined
to that movement of the troops which immediately precedes the
actual conflict and shock of battle;" a soldier is regarded as in
actual military service while he is engaged in the active duties of
the field, whether it be on the march, in the temporary camps, the
battle. siege. or bivouac.' Thus the nuncupative will of a soldier
on his way from one regiment to another, both of which are in
the field." of an officer with his regiment which is about to start on
a military expedition." or of a soldier ordered to the hospital when
on the narch to meet the enemy,'2 is valid. But a soldier is not in
service when quartered with his regiment in barracks,'" or when
home on a furlough,"4 or while on a tour of inspection of troops not
engaged in warfare, under his command.15
The principal case, Re Limond,' seems to present an extension
of tile rule as to soldier's wills. The war had ceased, and the shoot-
ing of the testator by a fanatic appears to have been an act which
(lid not result directly from the previous hostilities, but'which might
have occurred in India during any time of supposedly perfect peace.
The court. however, proceeded upon the ground that the expedition
had not vet been completed.
In tihe case of mariners, the question arises as to when a sea-
man is "at sea". Here, as in the case of soldiers, the tendency of
the courts is toward a liberal interpretation."?
'Drummond v. Parish, 3 Curt. 522 (Eng., 1843).
'Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Me. 561 (x866). In this case it is said, 'To
limit the soldier's privilege to those excursions from camps or quarters in
the enemy's country which are designed to bring on an immediate engage-
ment. would be to defeat it for the most part, except as to mere nuncupa-
tions. the proof of which, resting in the breasts of those who are similarly
exposed, may never be made available to the soldier's friends."
'Re Smith. 6 Phila. 1o4 (Pa. 1865). In Van Deuzer v. Gordon, 39
Vt. 111 (1866), the language is broader: "The term service . . . is the
exercise of military functions in the enemy's country in the time of war, or
the exercise of military functions in the soldier's own state or country in
case of insurrection or invasion."
'llerbert v. Herbert, Deane & S. to (Eng., x855).
"Thorne's Goods, it Jur. X. S. 569 (Eng., 1865).
"Gould v. Safford, 39 Vt. 498 (j866).
" White v. Repton. 3 Curt. 818 (Eng., 1844).
"Re Smith, supra, note 9.
Slilrs Goods, i Rob. 276 (Eng., 1845).
Supra, note 6.
"The mariner may exercise his right of nuncupation while the vessel
is on a voyage. but is lying at anchor in an arm of the sea, Hubbard v.
Iluhbard. sutpra. note 3: or while in the tidewaters of a harbor. Ex parte
Thompson. 4 Bradf. 1.4 (N. Y., 1856). A sailor attached to a vessel thus
circun stanced is "at sea" within the Wills Act, though he be temporarily
ashore on leave. Goods of Lay, 2 Curt. 375 (Eng., 184o).
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It is usually said that the general danger attaching to actual
military service and to life at sea is sufficient to warrant the making
of a nuncupative will. and that the soldier or sailor need not be
in e.rtremis or in fear of immediate death when making an oral
will.' This, point was not discussed in the principal case. but it ap-
peared there that the testator was actually dying of a mortal wound
when lie made his will.
E.E.
"'Re O'Connor. 121 N. Y. S. o3 (19og). See also r Schouler, Wills,
Sec. 367. 370 (ed. 1915); i Underhill, Wills, Sec. 1,-6 (ed. igoo).
